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Abstract
This paper describes techniques to help with COVID-
19 automated contact tracing, and with the restora-
tion efforts. We describe a decentralized protocol for
“proof-of-contact” (PoC) in zero knowledge where a
person can publish a short cryptographic proof at-
testing to the fact that they have been infected and
that they have come in contact with a set of people
without revealing any information about any of the
people involved. More importantly, we describe how
to compose these proofs to support broader function-
ality such as proofs of nth-order (transitive) exposure
which can further speed up automated contact trac-
ing. The cryptographic proofs can be publicly veri-
fied. In both cases, the burden (and control) is on
(and with) the person proving contact or health and
not on (with) third parties or healthcare providers
rendering the system more decentralized, and accord-
ingly more scalable.
1 Introduction
Contact tracing, identifying and notifying individuals
who have been in close contact with an infected in-
dividual, is widely recognized as an essential tool in
protecting against the spread of the novel COVID-
19 virus. Automated approaches to contact trac-
ing can help significantly scale the effort relative to
manual approaches alone which tend to be slower
and more labor intensive. Implementations of auto-
mated contact tracing systems must however address
the privacy concerns of individuals in order to enjoy
widespread adoption, something that early straight-
forward attempts failed to do [1, 2].
There is a large body of recent proposals for auto-
mated Bluetooth-based contact tracing systems with
differing privacy guarantees. We refer the reader
to [3] for a recent survey. The systems fall into two
general categories based on their information flows:
decentralized vs centralized. With decentralized ap-
proaches, a user’s mobile device generates ephemeral
randomized tokens that are regularly broadcast to
(and received by) nearby mobile devices. Devices
save the tokens they broadcast and the ones they re-
ceive for a defined period of time. Once an individual
tests positive, he can opt to report all the tokens his
application generated. Reporting is done with the
help of the healthcare provider or some third party.
Other individuals who saw the token, and accordingly
were in close physical proximity to the infected indi-
vidual, learn they are at-risk and may seek testing
and/or quarantine as a result. On the other hand,
centralized approaches use a central server to gener-
ate ephemeral tokens that users share with each other
and reporting involves the central server making the
connections and alerting users [3].
The majority of these existing proposals for auto-
mated contact tracing are slow to react and do not
adequately address exposure risk. Specifically, they
only alert the first level of individuals who have come
in close contact with the infected individual after the
latter tests positive. Such first order contact tracing
may not be fast enough to control the spread of the
virus in a timely manner given that there is a period
of time in which individuals can be asymptomatic but
infectious, and this period is generally longer than
the virus incubation period. Consider for example
the following scenario. Alice is asymptomatic but in-
fectious at time t0 and comes in contact with Bob.
Bob gets infected and comes in contact with Charlie
at time t1 ≥ t0 +PI where PI is the virus incubation
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period. Alice starts showing symptoms and tests pos-
itive at time t2 ≥ t1, at which point Bob gets notified.
Bob may not show symptoms, may wait to get tested,
or may not even get tested. Even if Bob gets tested
at time t3 > t2, there is a period of time (could be
several days) during which Charlie is not even aware
of the exposure risk, and is going about his business
as usual.
We propose a new protocol for privacy-preserving
contact tracing that does not suffer from these lim-
itations. Our protocol permits an individual A who
tests positive to quickly furnish a cryptographic proof
attesting to the the following statements:
1. individual A was in close proximity to individual
B at some time t
2. individual A tested positive for the virus at time
t′
3. t′ is within 14 days of t
in zero knowledge i.e., without leaking information
about A or B. A produces and publishes the proof.
Anyone, including, B can publicly verify the proof,
and seek testing if the proof checks and they are in-
volved. Using this first proof, individual(s) B who
came in close proximity to A can then quickly pub-
lish a cryptographic proof attesting to the fact that
B was in close proximity to the individual who tested
positive (in this case A), and that B was in close prox-
imity to other individual(s) C at t′′ ≥ t + PI . This
allows individual(s) C who came in close proximity to
B to realize their exposure risk in a timely manner,
and act accordingly.
Our protocol relies on zero-knowledge succinct
non-interactive arguments of knowledge (zk-SNARK)
as the cryptographic building block. Cryptographic
proofs are succinct, consisting of only a few hundred
bytes, and take just a few milliseconds to verify. The
zero knowledge property ensures that a person verify-
ing these proofs only learns the statement “I was close
to someone who tested positive for the virus” or “I
was close to someone who was close to someone who
tested positive for the virus” and so on, but nothing
else such as who the person is or where the interac-
tion occurred (with some caveats discussed later in
the paper). Our approach is fully decentralized re-
quiring little assistance from the healthcare provider,
and may be extended to support broader functional-
ity (e.g., proof of health/immunity). We start by de-
scribing the simple proof-of-contact protocol, and ex-
tend it to support transitive exposure by composing
proofs of contact using proof-carrying data (PCD) [4].
Additionally, we demonstrate a simple SNARK-based
construction of proof-of-health/immunity, useful for
a society in the restoration phases of a pandemic.
In summary, our protocol offers the following ben-
efits:
• Efficiency is achieved using efficient pre-
processing zk-SNARK construction and per-
forming the signature verification outside the
SNARK to reduce prover cost [5].
• No trusted third parties or databases required.
The public registry need not be trusted. We only
require that the zk-SNARK for the desired func-
tionality is correctly setup.
• Strong end-to-end privacy guarantees. Proxim-
ity tokens are not shared; not with third parties
nor with healthcare providers.
• Correctness. A valid proof guarantees the au-
thenticity of the user’s test results and the valid-
ity of the statement.
• Adoption/Practicality. A medical organization
only needs to sign records using an existen-
tially unforgeable and publicly verifiable signa-
ture scheme. This is a simple task for the med-
ical organization and it deters malicious (non-
infected) users from seeking signatures.
• Decentralization. The burden is on the in-
fected person to actually prove and publish.
This allows better scaling (instead of requiring
providers or third parties to centrally manage
patient proximity data) and potentially better
privacy since the user (the stakeholder) has full
control over their private data and can share at
will.
• Exposure risk using proof composition. Transi-
tive exposure risk is available in a timely manner
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through proof composition. This allows users
who may have had secondhand contact with an
individual who tested positive for a virus, to
learn in zero-knowledge about this exposure.
2 Background
2.1 Proximity Tokens
Contact tracing requires monitoring and recording
physical interactions between clients. For example,
if Alice walks into a cafe where Bob is eating, a
method for detecting and measuring their proximity
is needed. There have been several works proposing
various means of proximity sensing between mobile
phones, including using Bluetooth [6], WiFi [7], and
audio [8] signals.
Regardless of the underlying technology, we as-
sume a mobile phone frequently broadcasts proxim-
ity tokens that are received by nearby phones. For
example, within each epoch, the phone frequently
broadcasts its unique token, and receives tokens from
nearby phones. This simplified model has been
adopted by the majority of decentralized privacy-
preserving contact tracing protocols [3].
2.2 Preprocessing zk-SNARK
We review the definitions of arithmetic circuits, pre-
processing zero knowledge succinct non-interactive
arguments of knowledge (pp-zk-SNARKs) and we re-
fer the reader to [9] for details.
First, we introduce arithmetic circuit satisfiability
in Field F. An F-arithmetic circuit C : Fn×Fh → Fl
is defined by the relation RC = {(x, a) : C(x, a) =
0l}. Here a is called the witness (auxiliary input)
and x is the public input and the output is 0l. The
language of the circuit is defined by LC = {x :
∃a,C(x, a) = 0l}. Here x ∈ Fn (i.e., x is represented
as n field elements), a ∈ Fh, and the output in Fl.
A hashing circuit for example takes the (private)
input/witness a and its hash x, and asserts that
H(a) = x.
A preprocessing zk-SNARK (pp-zk-SNARK) for F-
arithmetic circuit satisfiability comprises three algo-
rithms (G,P, V ), corresponding to the Generator, the
Prover, and the Verifier.
G(λ,C)→ (pk, vk) Given a security parameter λ and
the F-arithmetic circuit C, sample a keypair
comprising a public proving key pk and a public
verification key vk.
P (pk, x, a)→ (pi) Given the public prover key pk and
any (c, a) ∈ RC , generate a succinct proof pi at-
testing that x ∈ LC
V (vk, x, pi)→ b ∈ {0, 1} checks that pi is a valid proof
for x ∈ LC .
2.3 Proof-carrying data
Proof-carrying data (PCD) captures the security
guarantees necessary for recursively composing zk-
SNARKs. More specifically, given a compliance pred-
icate
∏
, a PCD system checks that a computation in-
volving a set of incoming messages ~zin, private local
data zloc, and outgoing message zout, is
∏
-compliant.
Formally, a proof-carrying data system consists
of three polynomial-time algorithms (G,P, V ) corre-
sponding to the Generator, Prover, and Verifier.
G(λ,
∏
) → (pk, vk) Given a security parameter λ
and the compliance predicate
∏
expressed as a
F-arithmetic circuit, sample a keypair compris-
ing a public proving key pk and a public verifi-
cation key vk.
P (pk, ~zin, ~piin, zloc, zout) → (zout, piout) Given the
public prover key pk, a set of input messages
~zin along with compliance proofs ~piin, local input
zloc, and output zout, generate a succinct proof
piout attesting that zout is
∏
-compliant.
V (vk, z, pi) → b ∈ {0, 1} checks that zout is
∏
-
compliant.
3 Proof-of-Contact Protocol
Consider an existentially unforgeable signature
scheme S = (GS , SS , VS) (e.g., ECDSA) with pri-
vate signing key vs and public verification key ps.
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Let H,H1, H2 be three collision-resistant hash func-
tions. Let (G,P, V ) be a pp-zk-SNARK. The baseline
protocol builds on [10] and works as follows:
• Trusted setup phase: a trusted entity sets up
the system and runs the generator algorithm
G(λ,C) → (pk, vk); we describe the circuit C
in more detail shortly. During this phase, each
healthcare provider obtains a certificate for its
signing key signed by a trusted certification au-
thority.
• Each user generates a private random string S
• User A generates a random token every time
period t (the epoch e.g., 5 minute intervals) as
TA,t = H1(S, t), and frequently broadcasts the
token. We omit the time subscript hereafter
whenever it is clear.
• Whenever user A receives a proximity token from
user B at time t, she computes h = H2(TA, TB , t)
and stores it for 14 days. User B computes the
same output. Here we sort the tokens (e.g., lex-
icographically) before passing them to the hash
function.
• User A tests positive for the virus at time t′,
and obtains a “COVID.positive” test result from
a medical provider. User A computes hs =
H(S,COVID.positive, t′) and requests signature
s = SS(vs, hs) from the healthcare provider
where vs is the provider’s private signing key.
Note that user A does not have to reveal her
secret S to the provider. User A may pro-
vide hs only, and a cryptographic proof that
hs = H(S,COVID.positive, t
′) for some valid pri-
vate witness S.
• User A then generates a short cryptographic
proof using P (pk, (h, hs), (S, TA, TB , t
′))→ pi at-
testing to these facts
1. hs = H(S,COVID.positive, t
′)
2. TA = H1(S, t)
3. h = H2(TA, TB , t)
4. t′ − t ≤ 14 days
• User A publishes tuple (pi, h, hs, s) to some pub-
lic registry. If the public registry already con-
tains a tuple with the value h, then the user does
not upload these values (in order to prevent link-
ability). Several techniques may be used here for
network unlinkability (e.g., the user app can ei-
ther use mixing or onion routing solutions, or
the provider can publish the material on behalf
of the user).
• User B checks the public registry periodically
to find a matching h and can quickly verify
the proof using V (vk, (h, hs), pi). If the proof
checks, user B verifies the signature VS(ps, s, hs)
given hs and the public verification key ps of the
healthcare provider.
• User B seeks testing, and can show the proof-of-
contact to her healthcare provider to expedite
the process if needed.
3.1 Security Analysis
Linkability Tokens are never shared, or published.
Only the hash of two tokens is published after
a user tests positive. This means different to-
kens may not be linked as belonging to the same
user. The same is true with linking different
hashes. Recall when reporting a positive test,
user A publishes h = H2(TA, TB , t) for all prox-
imity edges. Only user B or some dishonest user
C who forms a clique with A and B at time t
may learn h. Since user C is part of the clique,
h does not leak additional information. User C
cannot use h to create valid proofs on behalf of A
or B without knowledge of their private strings
S.
Identification After seeing a proof containing h, a
curious user B who keeps track of all physical
encounters can a posteriori identify the infected
person in some form. This attack is common
to the majority of the decentralized systems [3].
We observe that some form of this leakage is in-
herent to the protocol. For example, if user B
has only encountered one person before getting
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alerted, user B will be able to identify the in-
fected person no matter how privacy-preserving
the alert/protocol is. This may be acceptable in
some cases, for example, learning that the “tall
person in the dairy aisle at the grocery store”
tested positive. A more recent decentralized pro-
tocol that mitigates identification attacks has
been proposed using “parroting” [11]. As dis-
cussed earlier, we think our general idea can be
applied to this class of protocols as well.
3.2 Proof of Health or Immunity
The same technique may be used by user A to prove
their health i.e., that user A received a negative test
from her healthcare provider within the past day or
week. The same is true for proving immunity with
the antibodies test that is gaining traction as commu-
nities look towards restoration. Using zk-SNARKs to
do this avoids any dissemination of the sensitive test
results to third parties keeping users in control and
maintaining decentralization. It also provides assur-
ances to the other party that allows them to trust the
result.
3.3 Transitive exposure proofs
As discussed earlier, it can be beneficial to provide
more granular nth order exposure risk data to users
to limit the spread of the virus. For example, a user
may want to know whether they have had transitive
exposure to a virus. Consider that Alice comes in
contact with both Bob and Charlie independently of
one another. Later, Bob tests positive for the virus,
and Alice is alerted that she is at risk. Although
Charlie did not directly come in contact with a car-
rier of the virus, he may find it useful to know that
someone he came in contact with has. This transitive
approach to contact tracing could enable more infor-
mative statistics for users such as a risk profile, i.e., a
risk score based on how many degrees of exposure an
individual has. Someone who is four transitive hops
away from a virus carrier would be at lower risk from
someone who is two hops away.
A strawman approach to extending the proof-of-
contact protocol for transitive proofs works as fol-
lows:
• As in the original protocol, a trusted entity sets
up the system and runs the generator algorithm
G(λ,C2) → (pk2, vk2); here C2 is an additional
circuit with corresponding prover and verifier
keys (pk2, vk2), for proving transitive exposure.
• User B checks the public registry periodically to
find a matching hi (from some user A who tested
positive) and can quickly verify the proof us-
ing V (vk, (hi, hs), pi). If the proof checks, user B
verifies the signature VS(ps, s, hs) given hs and
the public verification key ps of the healthcare
provider.
• User B then generates a
short cryptographic proof using
P (pk2, (hi, hj), (S, TA, TB1, TB2, TC)) → pi
attesting to these facts
1. hi = H2(TA, TB1, t1)
2. hj = H2(TB2, TC , t2)
3. t2 − t1 ≤ 3 days
• User B publishes tuple (pi, hi, hj) to the public
registry.
• User C checks the public registry periodically
to find a matching hj and can quickly verify
the proof using V (vk2, (hi, hj), pi). If the proof
checks, user C can recursively verify the next
proof in the chain until eventually arriving at
the original proof. Finally, user C verifies the
original proof using V (vk, (hi, hs), pi).
Observe that in this case the SNARK includes the
constraint t2 − t1 ≤ 3, corresponding to the 3 day
incubation period of COVID-19. The parameter is
configurable, however, in general the time that Bob
comes in contact with Charlie should come after the
time Bob came in contact with Alice plus the incuba-
tion period. This will reduce the number of false posi-
tives that arise when Bob alerts Charlie of 2nd-order
exposure even though Bob could not have possibly
become contagious from Alice yet.
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3.4 Transitive exposure using proof-
carrying data
The above protocol suffers from a linkability flaw with
the uploaded (hi, hj) pairs. An adversary observing
the public registry can deduce that whoever uploaded
hi must have came in contact with the person who
uploaded hj . In order to circumvent this drawback,
we modify the protocol to use proof-carrying data
(PCD). Using PCD, previous proofs in the chain are
verified and a proof that this verification was per-
formed correctly is provided. The PCD system hides
the details of intermediate proofs, while allowing a
user to verify that the entire chain is valid. Instead
of uploading the pairs (hi, hj), transitive proofs con-
sist only of single h values which are indistinguishable
from random.
For proof-of-contact, we represent the compliance
predicate
∏
as the hospital signature verification al-
gorithm VS(ps, s, hs), coupled with the steps neces-
sary to prove that the randomness of hi is consis-
tent with the randomness of some hj . More for-
mally, a user who tested positive can perform the∏
-compliant computation M0 that takes as input
~zin = (hs, s, ps), zloc = (t, t
′, TB1) and outputs hi
satisfying the following constraints:
1. hs = H(S,COVID.positive, t
′)
2. TA = H1(S, t)
3. hi = H2(TA, TB1, t)
4. t′ − t ≤ 14 days
5. VS(ps, s, hs) = 1
The user then uploads the value hi along with
a cryptographic proof attesting that M0 is
∏
-
compliant.
For proving transitive exposure, a user B who sees
the value hi along with the PCD proof pii attest-
ing to first-hand exposure, performs the
∏
-compliant
computation M1 that takes as input ~zin = (hi, pii),
zloc = (t1, t2, TC) and outputs hj satisfying the fol-
lowing constraints:
1. hi = H2(TA, TB1, t1)
2. hj = H2(TB2, TC , t2)
3. t2 − t1 ≤ 3 days
Additionally, user B runs a verifier circuit
over pii and provides a cryptographic proof that
V (vk, hj , pii) = 1 and M1 is
∏
-compliant. Figure
1 illustrates the complete flow from proof-of-contact
to proof of transitive exposure.
Choice of digital signature scheme Encoding
the digital signature verification scheme inside
the compliance predicate is expensive with re-
spect to circuit size. For this reason, we choose
the RSA digital signature scheme which can
be represented efficiently over Fp by choosing
public exponent e = 3 and performing modular
multiplication via radix b√pc arithmetic as
suggested in [5].
3.5 Proofs of surface transmission via
PCD
In some cases, contact tracing by measuring proxim-
ity between users may not be sufficient for effectively
curbing the spread of a virus. A virus that lives for
extended periods on surfaces could transmit from one
user to another even though they have never been in
close contact. For example, if a contagious user Alice
sits on a park bench, Bob, who visits the park the
next day, may become infected from sitting on the
same bench. If Alice tests positive, it would be ideal
that users who are at risk from the surface spread of
the virus are alerted.
One approach is to place Bluetooth devices around
public spaces, and have them participate in the con-
tact tracing protocol. The devices could exchange
tokens with users and verify proofs in the usual way.
After discovering a matching token, and verifying the
corresponding proof, the device uploads a transitive
proof of exposure, which alerts users of the surface
transmission risk.
Suppose rather than using PCD, the Bluetooth de-
vice on the park bench simply uploads its secondary
tokens, i.e., the tokens exchanged with users within
14 days of Alice’s park visit. Although Bob is alerted
of his surface contact, he must trust that the park
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Figure 1: Overview of proof-carrying data for transi-
tive exposure
bench Bluetooth device is acting honestly since he
has no way of verifying that an infected user actually
came in contact with the park bench. By using PCD,
Bob maintains all the security and privacy guarantees
that hold from the original contact tracing protocol.
4 Performance Evaluation
We implemented a simplified proof-of-concept zero-
knowledge proof-of-contact SNARK using the lib-
snark library [12]. The library uses the NP-complete
language R1CS to express the arithmetic circuits
that represent the SNARK. There are existing R1CS
gadgets for performing useful functionality, such as
comparisons and collision-resistant hashing. It in-
cludes an implementation of the subset-sum collision-
resistant hashing gadget, which we use as an efficient
one-way hash.
We characterize the performance of our proof-of-
contact SNARK in terms of the running time and
key sizes for both the prover and verifier (Table 1).
Since the generator phase is only executed once dur-
ing setup, we provide concrete numbers on the size of
the arithmetic circuit (3060 gates) but disregard the
time of the generator (166 ms). The circuit did not
account for sorting.
5 Related Work
There are a few existing proposals for privacy-
preserving contact tracing [10] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17].
Although most of these works suggest similar tech-
Table 1: Performance of PoC pp-zk-SNARK imple-
mentation on MacBook Pro with 2.9 GHz Intel core
i9 and 32 GB RAM
Prover Verifier
Running time (ms) 65 9
Key size (KB) 722 30
niques for estimating and exchanging proximity infor-
mation between users, the underlying cryptographic
protocols and their privacy guarantees differ.
[10] [14] use randomly generated pseudonyms that
nearby users can exchange over Bluetooth. Individ-
uals who test positive for a virus can upload their
generated pseudonyms to a public registry, allow-
ing other users to match the tokens they have col-
lected with those in the registry. Both works suggest
that healthcare workers should be the ones to upload
users’ tokens to the public registry after giving a pos-
itive test diagnosis in order to prevent malicious pol-
luting of the database. Similar to the protocol intro-
duced in this work, mixing can be applied to prevent
linkability via traffic analysis.
Apple and Google have released a protocol speci-
fication that closely resembles that of [10] and [14].
Users generate a rolling pseudorandom identifier and
some associated encrypted metadata, that nearby
users exchange over Bluetooth. The pseudorandom
identifiers are derived using the current time and tem-
porary exposure keys, which get distributed after a
positive diagnosis.
Finally, [16] proposes partitioning GPS and time
data into discrete spatiotemporal points and obfus-
cating these points using a one-way hash function.
Infected users upload their obfuscated location his-
tories after redacting personally identifiable informa-
tion such as the GPS coordinates that represent a
home or work address. Using private-set intersection
(PSI), individuals can privately determine whether
or not their location history overlaps with that of
infected users. The privacy guarantees of such an
approach differ significantly from that offered in [10]
[14] [15], and those presented in this paper.
The approaches described above provide differ-
ent flavors of privacy and decentralization. How-
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ever, each solution places an increased burden on the
healthcare providers relative to the zero-knowledge
SNARK technique we have outlined. Our approach
requires only that healthcare workers sign positive
diagnoses rather than generate one-time codes or up-
load tokens to a public registry. Additionally, our
approach is fully decentralized and supports broader
functionality such as proofs of transitive exposure,
not currently supported by the other proposed solu-
tions.
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